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Abstract
Socio-economic convergence is usually discussed by keeping in mind
the harmonisation of income level across countries.  This analysis is
typically limited to national macroeconomic indicators. This paper
adapts theoretical fundamentals and uses methods of socio-economic
convergence evaluation to analyse social protection expenditures in
EU countries. We have attempted to verify the hypothesis of reduction
of differences in social protection expenditure over the period 1993–
2000 for two chosen variables: per capita social protection
expenditure and total social protection expenditure as a share of GDP.
We use two different approaches to find an answer to this. The
first method tests for the presence of ? -convergence using data which
provide an overall measure of changes in dispersion. The second
method tests the presence of absolute and conditional ? -convergence
in the same variables. Both methods confirm generally the presence of
statistically significant convergence over the periods examined.
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1. Introduction
Social protection expenditure in the EU increased in 1993-2000 in
connection with the expanding needs for and rise in the level of social
protection. Average social protection expenditure in EU in 1993 were
25.4% of GDP, in 2000 27.3%. Social protection expenditure per
capita in the same period increased from 4600 PPS to 6148 PPS1 (The
Social, 2002), whereas the amount and change rate of the expenditure
vary considerably from country to country.
According to the economic theory of convergence, the economic
development level of less developed countries should approach the
level of more advanced countries with the same economic resources or
fundamentals. Accordingly, estimates of social protection expenditure
in EU countries indicate faster development of countries with lower level
of social protection in recent years. Many reforms accomplished there
have helped to raise the social protection level in less developed
countries. A comparison of social protection expenditure and evaluation
of changes there should also characterise the social convergence process
between EU countries. This chapter seeks to evaluate and verify the
presence or non-presence of convergence in social protection in EU
countries and find which have been the most significant conditional
factors that have influenced this process.
The paper examines the degree of convergence in social
protection across EU countries. We have used two principal methods of
convergence evaluation for analysing this problem. The first method
tests for the presence of ? -convergence using data over the period
1993–2000.  This method provides an overall measure of change in
dispersion for two chosen variables: total social protection expenditure
as a share of GDP and per capita social protection expenditure. The
second method tests for the presence of absolute and conditional ? -
convergence in the same variables but also includes initial level of
3social protection expenditure as an explanatory variable in the
derivation of a log linear regression model.
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, we present the
theoretical concepts and econometric models of the assessment of
convergence. In the next section, we present the basic data and trends
of social protection expenditure. Section 4 reports the empirical results
of ? -convergence and ? -convergence in social protection expenditure.
In the end, there are some concluding remarks offered.
2. Methods and Data
Socio-economic convergence is mainly discussed in the context and
on the basis of two main economic growth theories: neo-classical
(Solow, 1956; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) and endogenous
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Baldwin, 1992)2. But both approaches
lead to the same three principal measures of convergence (Quah,
1996; Sala-i-Martin, 1996): ? -convergence, absolute ? -convergence
and conditional ? -convergence.
One of the simplest methods for estimating socio-economic
convergence is calculation of s -convergence, which is based on
standard deviation. With this method, it is possible to examine how
the dispersion between national income levels (or other indicators) has
changed, or how the differences of indicators inside groups of
countries are changing compared to the average (Streissler, 1979;
Barro, 1984; Baumol, 1986; Dorwick and Nguyen, 1989; Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992a, 1992b). A reduction of the standard
deviation of indicators indicates a reduction of the difference or the
presence of s -convergence.
The test for the presence of ? -convergence (Barro, 1984;
Baumol, 1986; DeLong, 1988; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992a,
1992b; Sala-i-Martin, 1994; Boyle and McCarthy, 1997) posits that ? -
convergence exists if a poor economy tends to grow at a faster rate
than a rich one so that the poor country tends to catch up in terms of
per capita income or product.
The literature makes distinction between absolute (unconditional)
and conditional ? -convergence. Absolute ? -convergence pertains to
the coefficient ?  of the bivariate equation.  This is based on the
assumption that all countries in the sample converge to the same
steady state. Conditional ? -convergence pertains to the coefficient ?
of the socio-economic level variable in an equation that includes
additional explanatory variables reflecting differences across
4countries, which direct each economy to converge to its own steady
state. In both cases, the convergence hypothesis is that the growth rate
of a socio-economic indicator will be negatively related to the level of
this indicator.
Technically, ? -convergence exists if the rate of growth of output
is negatively correlated with the level of per capita income in a
regression model. Although it is generally assumed that a precondition
for s -convergence to work is the presence of ß-convergence, several
authors (for example, Sala-i-Martin, 1996) state that ? -convergence is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for ? -convergence.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1996)
show that absolute convergence of income in the United States has
occurred from 1840 to 1980, with the rate of ? -convergence estimated
to be around 2 percent per year. As a rule, most other researchers have
found similar results for the speed of convergence as they have
adopted the particular estimation procedures used by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin.
We used the following equation to estimate absolute ? -
convergence:
(1/T)ln(YiT/Yi0)= ? 0+? 1ln(Yi0) , (1)
where the left-hand side is the average annual growth rate of social
protection expenditure in country i from year 0 to year T. The
condition for ? -convergence is the test that ? 1<0.
That is, the lower the initial level of social protection
expenditure, the higher the growth rate, or poor countries grow faster
than rich ones and as a consequence, social protection expenditure
inevitably converge. However, ? 1<0 does not necessarily guarantee
that the variance of dependent variable is lower at the end of the
period than at the beginning.
For estimation of the rate (speed) of convergence we used the
following equation:
(1/T)ln(YiT/Yi0) = ? 0 -[(1-e(-? T))/T]lnYi0 , (2)
where ?  is the rate (speed) of convergence and the rate of convergence
grows with parameter ? .
Conditional ? -convergence recognises that different countries
may have different steady states so that at any given level of capital
per worker, the marginal product will differ between countries. Arena
et al. (2000) has emphasised that evidence of conditional ? -
convergence of real regional GDP per capita does not imply that real
5regional income will converge on the same value, but, rather that there
will be convergence to different steady state levels of real income.
Conditional ? -convergence is equivalent to sustained differences
in the levels of regional real income per head. The very rapid rates of
income convergence that were found arise, at least in part, from the
regions having fairly similar levels of income per head. According to
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), the more diverse initial levels of
regional incomes and the longer sample period are the reasons for the
slower estimated income convergence. Cho (1994, 1996) and Easterly
(2001) argue that the control variables used to hold the steady state
level of income constant are endogenous to the level of income. Cho
argues that once the simultaneity bias is eliminated, conditional
convergence does not hold3.
Tests for conditional ? -convergence attempt to hold constant the
steady state by adding variables to equation (1), so the specification of
the test for convergence changes from version of equation (1) and
includes additional explanatory variables:
    (1/T)ln(YiT/Yi0)=? 0+? 1ln(Yi0)+?Xi  , (3)
where Xi is a vector of variables that controls for the additional
characteristics affecting the steady state and ?  is a coefficient vector.
The test for convergence is a test that ? 1<0.
For estimation of conditional ? -convergence to take account of
both the temporal pattern of convergence and the cross-sectional
variety of the EU countries, we use at the example of Nixon (1999)
the following equation:
 ln(Yi,t/Yi,t-1)=? 0+? iDi+(? 1+? iDi) ln(Yi,t-1)+?Xi, t-1 , (4)
where  Xi, t-1 is a vector of variables that hold constant the steady state,
   Di  is a set of dummy 1 or 0 variables for each country i=1… 15,
   ? i  is a shift parameter and
   ? i is a slope parameter.
In this equation, the statistical significance of the country-specific
parameters allow for diversity in the steady state and in the speed of
convergence.  We choose this method as opposed to analysis of time
series tendency for convergence across EU countries because of the
short time series of the study.
We assess the social protection level in EU countries with the
help of several indicators. The share of social protection expenditure
in gross domestic product (GDP) gives us the most general idea.
Another indicator used is social expenditure per capita, which is in
6order to reduce the influence of price differences between countries
expressed on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPS). To evaluate
social protection level, we also use indicators that characterise
proportions between individual functions of social protection.
Changes in the structure of social protection financing at the main
contributor level as a possible convergence evaluation indicator have
been thoroughly studied by Hagfors (1999, 2000), and they are
therefore not discussed here. In this paper, convergence of social
protection expenditure has been studied using the two first-mentioned
indicators. We have analysed presence of convergence in four major
functions of social protection: old age and survivors, sickness/health
care and disability, family/children, unemployment. We have used
harmonised data of social protection expenditure and GDP collected
by Eurostat and European Commission. Our sample covers the period
of 1993–2000 and the countries under study are the EU 15 member
states.
3. Background
In 2000, social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP
remained stable in EU-15 at the level of 27.3%. The trend in this ratio
was irregular in the period 1990–2000. A substantial growth was
registered between 1990–1993 (the ratio increased by 3.5 percentage
points), primarily as a result of a slow-down in GDP growth and a rise
in unemployment benefits (Abramovici, 2002). The biggest growth in
this period was in Finland (9.1 percentage points). Between 1993–
1996, expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP
showed a slight downward trend, due partly to an upturn in GDP and
partly to a slow-down in the growth of social protection expenditure
(largely a result of a drop in unemployment benefits). In 1997, social
protection expenditure started to diminish slowly (by 2000, 1.4
percentage points compared to 1996). The fall in the share of
expenditure in GDP between 1996 and 2000 was most obvious in
Finland (? 6.9 points), in Ireland and Denmark (? 4.8 points). The
biggest decline has been in countries with larger social protection
expenditure and the biggest growth in countries with smaller
expenditure, with the exception of Ireland where the level of social
protection expenditure in GDP has been the lowest among EU
member states since 1993 and is still falling. The strong growth of
GDP in recent years largely explains the fall in the ratio in Ireland.
7Figure 1.  Social Protection Expenditure Per Capita at PPS,
 Constant Prices in the Years 1993 and 2000 in EU
Social protection expenditure per capita (PPS, constant prices) in
EU-15 increased on the average 4.1% per year over the period 1990-
1993, with the biggest growth in Portugal and United Kingdom. Only
in Greece both the share of social protection expenditure in GDP and
social protection expenditure per capita diminished in this period. In
the period 1993–1996, the average growth slowed down to 1.6% per
year in EU-15. In Portugal and UK, the real rate of growth fell sharply
compared with the previous period (by 4.3% and 1.6% respectively
per year). In Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden per capita
expenditure actually fell in real terms. The biggest growth in real
expenditure was in Denmark, Germany and Ireland, though in the
latter the share of social protection expenditure in GDP started to
decline in 1995.  The growth rate in EU-15 between 1995 and 2000
was similar ?  1.7% per year. The rates increased in all countries
except in Finland and Denmark. The biggest growth was in Greece
(6.9% per year) and Portugal (5.8% per year).
The gaps between countries are generally related to disparate
levels of wealth and reflect differences in institutional structure of the
social protection systems, demographic change, unemployment rates
and economic factors.
Social protection systems cover the same functions in all EU
countries. Social protection generally embraces 8 functions:
sickness/health care, disability, old age, survivors, family/children,
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
A B D DK E EL F FIN I IRL L NL P S UK
€
1993 2000
EU-15 EU-15
8unemployment, housing and social exclusion not elsewhere classified.
For this analysis, we merge the spheres that fulfil principally similar
functions and discuss them as follows: old age and survivors,
sickness/health care and disability, family/children, and unemploy-
ment. Expenditures on these spheres account for over 95% of all
expenditures (the largest part not covered in analysis in the
Netherlands ?  7.3% and the smallest in Italy – 0.2%). The proportions
of the spheres vary across countries, over time and are influenced by
different growth rates of expenditure compared to the EU average.
The bulk of social protection expenditures in all countries are
expenditures on old-age and survivor’s pensions, which accounted on
average for 46.4% of total expenditure in EU-15 in 2000 and have
increased on average by 2.5 percentage points since 1993. Much
different from other countries are Italy, where this expenditure
accounted for 63.4% in 2000, and Ireland where the expenditure
accounted only for 25.4% of total expenditure. The contributory factor
to these differences includes the high percentage of population aged
65 or over in Italy (18.2%) and the relatively low retirement age (60
years for women) compared to other countries. In Ireland, however,
the population is the youngest in Europe (those aged 65 and over
account for only 11.2%) and the retirement age is one of the highest in
Europe (66 years). With the growing old-age dependency rate (those
aged 65 years or more accounted on average for 14.5% of the
population in EU in 1990 and 16.3% in 2000), several countries are
reforming their retirement systems. The effects of these reforms will
be evident in the future and are not discussed here.
Another major sphere of social protection expenditure in all
countries is sickness/health care and disability. The sickness/health
care functions together showed a more moderate growth rate than the
average increase in total per capita expenditure. The share of health
expenditure in total expenditure has remained on the same level as in
1993 – approximately 35%.
Expenditures on unemployment (growth 48% and rise of share in
total expenditure 2.4 percentage points) increased sharply in 1990–
1993 and started to fall again in 1996 (share in total expenditure
dropped from 8.1% to 6.3% in the period 1996–2000). There are
notable differences across countries in this function, with the smallest
expenditure in Italy and Luxembourg, the highest in Spain, Belgium,
Finland and the United Kingdom. The fall of expenditures on
unemployment was determined in part by a gradual improvement in
the economic situation and in part by reforms in the compensation
system in some countries, limiting the duration of payment of benefits
9and changing the conditions of eligibility for such benefits.
Average expenditures on the children/family function as a
percentage of total expenditure in EU-15 went up from 7.7% in 1993
to 8.2% in 2000. This growth was marked in 1996 when Germany
introduced reforms and extended the family benefit system. The child
benefits have grown nearly twofold in Luxembourg, France and
Denmark. However, there are still great differences in child benefit
rates and also in expenditures on child benefits across countries.
4. Empirical Results
4.1.  Sigma-convergence
A simple method for evaluation of convergence is calculation of s -
convergence based on standard deviation. A reduction of the standard
deviation of indicators indicates a reduction of differences or presence
of s -convergence. We evaluate social s -convergence between EU
countries using both social protection expenditure per capita at PPS
(Table 1) and share of social protection expenditure in GDP (Table 2).
In order to assess s -convergence, we take the EU average level as the
basis for comparison and find the level of each EU country compared
to the average over the period of analysis.
Table 1. Evidence of ? -Convergence of Social Protection
Expenditure Per Capita at PPS in EU, 1993–2000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Arithmetical mean
(x–  ) 1.004 1.014 1.015 1.006 1.006 1.004 1.009 1.008
Standard deviation
(s ) 0.287 0.289 0.286 0.284 0.270 0.265 0.264 0.259
Variation coef.
(s / x –  ) 0.286 0.285 0.282 0.282 0.269 0.264 0.261 0.257
Max ratio to
EU-15 1.400 1.402 1.444 1.438 1.424 1.416 1.479 1.500
Min ratio to
EU-15 0.490 0.504 0.521 0.523 0.548 0.578 0.593 0.597
This analysis indicates that the standard deviation (indicator of s -
convergence) of social protection expenditure per capita decreased in
the years 1993–2000 (from 0.286 to 0.259), but there is no evidence of
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s -convergence in income since 1997 (Rajasalu, 2001). Earlier studies
on social protection expenditures demonstrated (Sosvilla-Rivero,
2003) that they increased most in rich countries in EU in the period
1985–1995, and started to decline after 1995. The growth of social
protection expenditures in poor countries continued. The ratio of
maximum and minimum expenditure to EU average as depicted in
Table 1 indicates that both the maximum and minimum indicator has
increased compared to EU average: the growth of the maximum
indicator in ratio to EU average from 1.400 to 1.500 and the growth of
the minimum indicator from 0.490 to 0.597. In order to take into
consideration the impact of price changes in different countries, we
evaluate s -convergence of social protection expenditure also on the
basis of constant prices. Calculations at constant prices (Püss and
Viies, 2002) confirmed the occurrence of social convergence
(indicator of s -convergence from 0.322 in 1995 to 0.270 in 1999).
Table 2. Evidence of ? -Convergence of Social Protection
Expenditure as a Share in GDP (in %) in EU, 1993 - 2000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Arithmetical mean
(x–  ) 0.973 0.977 0.972 0.969 0.956 0.954 0.944 0.939
Standard deviation
(s ) 0.192 0.180 0.177 0.165 0.151 0.151 0.167 0.168
Variation coef.
(s / x –  ) 0.197 0.184 0.182 0.170 0.158 0.158 0.177 0.179
Max ratio to EU-15 1.336 1.304 1.249 1.213 1.196 1.202 1.192 1.183
Min ratio to EU-15 0.633 0.727 0.698 0.659 0.612 0.581 0.533 0.516
Additionally we analyse changes in social protection expenditure
per capita in EU member states compared to EU average and ascertain
the linear trends that characterise them. The results are illustrated
graphically in Figure 2. As you can see, social protection expenditures
per capita in six countries with the highest social protection level -
France, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland - have
diminished compared to EU average. The expenditure has increased in
four countries with low level of expenditures: in Portugal, Greece,
Italy and Ireland. Spain and UK have not converged to EU average in
this respect and their relative level has remained unchanged. In sharp
contrast with the above general tendencies of convergence are Austria,
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Germany and Luxembourg, where these expenditures continue to rise
rapidly in spite of the high level of social expenditure per capita.
Figure 2. Social Protection Expenditure Per Capita in EU Member
States Compared to EU Average in 1993-2000
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Assessment of s -convergence based on the share of social
protection expenditure in GDP (indicator of s -convergence from 0.192
– 0.168) also indicates convergence of social protection levels. Unlike
social protection expenditure per capita, the ratio of both maximum
and minimum indicator to EU mean has diminished in share changes.
The lowest level in 1993 and in 1994 was in Portugal, but since 1995
Ireland has taken this position where the decline compared to EU
average continued incessantly. Its possible reasons - relatively young
population, fast economic growth, etc. were mentioned above.
Table 3. Evidence of s -Convergence of Social Protection
Expenditure by Sphere, at PPS per capita, in EU
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Sickness & disability
Arithmetical mean (x–  ) 1.019 1.028 1.038 1.032 1.041 1.040 1.049 1.048
Standard deviation (s ) 0.346 0.332 0.345 0.324 0.313 0.299 0.305 0.301
Variation coef. (s / x –  ) 0.339 0.322 0.332 0.314 0.300 0.287 0.291 0.287
Max 1.505 1.524 1.593 1.601 1.615 1.583 1.594 1.654
Min 0.481 0.532 0.543 0.557 0.551 0.576 0.548 0.587
Old age & survivors
Arithmetical mean (x–  ) 0.932 0.951 0.962 0.960 0.951 0.951 0.934 0.932
Standard deviation (s ) 0.317 0.325 0.329 0.314 0.302 0.290 0.276 0.277
Variation coef. (s / x –  ) 0.340 0.342 0.342 0.327 0.317 0.305 0.296 0.297
Max 1.442 1.488 1.548 1.504 1.464 1.441 1.289 1.301
Min 0.389 0.388 0.385 0.354 0.352 0.354 0.332 0.335
Family & children
Arithmetical mean (x–  ) 1.169 1.222 1.225 1.145 1.124 1.140 1.149 1.178
Standard deviation (s ) 0.663 0.717 0.732 0.656 0.617 0.659 0.685 0.736
Variation coef. (s / x –  ) 0.567 0.587 0.598 0.573 0.549 0.578 0.596 0.625
Max 2.220 1.462 2.576 2.431 2.356 2.642 2.772 3.063
Min 0.159 0.149 0.154 0.172 0.171 0.187 0.186 0.200
Unemployment
Arithmetical mean (x–  ) 1.055 1.099 1.122 1.118 1.129 1.107 1.056 1.075
Standard deviation (s ) 0.642 0.652 0.661 0.626 0.604 0.576 0.574 0.550
Variation coef. (s / x –  ) 0.608 0.593 0.589 0.559 0.535 0.521 0.544 0.511
Max 2.392 2.431 2.509 2.384 2.186 2.123 2.048 2.123
Min 0.191 0.197 0.277 0.282 0.324 0.311 0.293 0.255
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As indicated above, developments and changes in social protection
functions have been different across countries. Using the indicator of s -
convergence (see Table 3), we estimate whether and in which spheres
convergence of levels between countries has occurred in the period of
analysis.
The analysis indicated a reduction of the standard deviation, or
convergence of levels in three spheres of social protection in the period
of analysis: sickness and disability, old age and survivors, and
unemployment. The standard deviation increased in payment of child
and family benefits, indicating that no convergence of this function has
taken place between countries, which means divergence has occurred.
4.2. Absolute ? -convergence
We also test for absolute and conditional ? -convergence of the two
measures of real social protection expenditure: social protection
expenditures as a share of GDP and per capita (at PPS). We use
harmonised cross-sectional data on social protection expenditures per
capita (at PPS) and GDP in the EU in 1993-2000 collected by
Eurostat. Following Sala-i-Martin (1996), we use log linear regression
to estimate the annual growth rate of the expenditure share based on
the initial level of the share at the beginning of the period. If the slope
coefficient (? 1) is negative, we say that there exists absolute
convergence in social protection expenditure as a share of GDP and
per capita (see, Table 4 and Appendix 1). In the same way, we can
estimate the speed of convergence using a non-linear model.
Table 4. Absolute ? -Convergence in Social Protection Expenditure
and Speed of Convergence in EU in 1993-2000, Annual
Growth Rate Per Capita at PPS
1993-2000 1993-1996 1996-1997 1997-2000
Coef. Std
Error
Coef. Std.
Error
Coef. Std.
Error
Coef. Std.
Error
? 1 -0.037*** (0.010)-0.033* (0.017)-0.085*** (0.025)-0.029* (0.016)
? 0  0.043*** (0.004) 0.054*** (0.006) 0.028*** (0.008) 0.039*** (0.005)
ß  0.043*** (0.014) 0.035* (0.019) 0.089***  0.031 (0.017)
 Adj.R2 0.50 0.22 0.47 0.21
 Thalf 16 20 8 23
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; * p<0.1
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Our findings are in line with those presented in Alonso et al.
(1998), where indicators of ? -convergence suggest a certain degree of
convergence in social protection benefits for EU-11 during the period
1966-1994. Our estimation gave statistically significant coefficients of
the explanatory variables over all time intervals in the period 1993-
2000. In particular, the ? 1 coefficient is negative and statistically
significant in the period 1993-2000 with value ? 1= ? 0.037 and 95%
confidence interval –0.059<? 1<-0.015 and also ? 1<0. Therefore, on
the whole, our results satisfy the strong conditions for convergence in
social protection expenditures per capita across fifteen EU member
states over the time period 1993-2000. Table 4 reports the ? -
convergence regressions separately for 1993-1996, 1997-2000 and
1996-1997. Three time intervals over the period estimated show the
different level of convergence, and also different statistical
significance.
The speed of convergence has been rather low (see Table 4) and
decreased in the later relative to the former period. Starting from the
1993 social expenditure levels it would take approximately 16 years
for one-half of the social protection expenditure differences between
member countries and EU average to disappear at 4.3% annual rate of
convergence (the parameter ?  estimating speed of convergence
indicates that social protection expenditure was converging in the
period 1993-2000 by 4.3 per cent annually). The speed of convergence
was particularly high in 1996-1997 (8.9% annually). But in the period
1997-2000, it would have taken 23 years for one-half of the social
protection expenditure differences between member countries to come
up to the EU average due to the annual speed of 3.1%.
Figure 3 illustrates the social protection expenditures per head at
PPS convergence across EU countries in the period 1993-2000. The
initial level is on the horizontal axis and the annual rate of growth on
the vertical axis and for the convergence to exist, the regression line
must be sloping downwards. Figure 3 presents the evidence on ? -
convergence by plotting the change in the social protection
expenditures per capita (at PPS) over the period 1993-2000. The
figure displays the convergence hypothesis since a higher initial social
protection expenditure level is associated with lower growth in the
level over the period. As it was shown already in Table 4, there has
been absolute ? -convergence in social protection expenditure in all
periods under study.
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Figure 3. Absolute ? -Convergence in Social Protection Expenditure
in the EU in 1993-2000, per capita at PPS
Analogously with total social protection expenditure we have
also found ? -convergence for four social protection spheres (see Table
5 and Appendix 1).
Presence of absolute convergence (ß1< 0) in all spheres indicates
dependence of growth of the respective sphere on the initial level of
the indicator. The connection was stronger in the sphere of sickness
and disability in the years 1993-2000 (Adj.R2 = 0.51) and in
unemployment (Adj.R2 = 0.43). Figure 4 illustrates the presence of ß-
convergence in 1993–2000. Considering that developments have been
relatively uneven throughout the period under study, ? -convergence
was found to be significantly present also for shorter periods, but the
results received were not statistically very reliable in all spheres. The
analysis enables us to conclude that convergence between countries in
the period under study can be influenced by other factors in addition
to level of expenditure.
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Table 5. ß-Convergence in Social Protection Expenditure by Sphere,
at PPS per capita
1993-2000 1993-1996 1996-1997 1997-2000
Coef. Std
Error
Coef. Std.
Error
Coef. Std.
Error
Coef. Std.
Error
Sickness & disability
? 1 -0.036*** (0.010)-0.027 (0.019)-0.080** (0.032)-0.040* (0.019)
? 0  0.048*** (0.003) 0.049*** (0.007) 0.029** (0.011) 0.054*** (0.006)
ß  0.041*** (0.013) 0.028 (0.021) 0.083** (0.035) 0.042* (0.021)
Adj. R2 0.51 0.14 0.32 0.26
 Thalf 17 25 8 17
Old-age & survivors
? 1 -0.024* (0.013)-0.025 (0.021)-0.038 (0.029)-0.015 (0.013)
? 0  0.048*** (0.005) 0.064*** (0.009) 0.038*** (0.011) 0.038*** (0.005)
ß  0.026 (0.015) 0.026 (0.023) 0.039 (0.030) 0.015 (0.013)
Adj. R2 0.22 0.10 0.12 0.09
 Thalf 26 26 18 47
Family & children
? 1 -0.016* (0.009)-0.016 (0.013)-0.034** (0.015)-0.011 (0.013)
? 0  0.053*** (0.006) 0.067*** (0.010) 0.033** (0.011) 0.045*** (0.009)
ß  0.017* (0.010) 0.016 (0.014) 0.035** (0.016) 0.011 (0.014)
Adj. R2 0.22 0.10 0.28 0.05
 Thalf 40 43 20 63
Unemployment
? 1 -0.051** (0.016)-0.058** (0.021)-0.049* (0.015)-0.047 (0.033)
? 0 -0.013 (0.013) 0.017 (0.016)-0.029 (0.017)-0.029 (0.021)
ß  0.063** (0.025) 0.063** (0.025) 0.050* (0.027) 0.050 (0.039)
Adj. R2 0.43 0.37 0.22 0.13
 Thalf 11 11 14 14
* p<0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01
Regarding the share of social protection expenditures in GDP,
our results demonstrate (Appendix 1) that some kind of absolute ? -
convergence possibly took place over the period 1993-2000 (the
estimated coefficients of explanatory variables were statistically non-
significant). Divergence was found to have taken place in the period
1997-2000.
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Figure 4.  Absolute ? -Convergence in Social Protection Expenditure
by Sphere in the EU in 1993-2000, per capita at PPS
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4.3. Conditional ? -convergence
? -convergence examines whether the initial level of the share of social
protection expenditures possesses explanatory power for the
subsequent change. Of course, other factors also influence social
protection expenditure shares. The ? -convergence test allows adding
these determinants, thus the test is conditional. Conditional ? -
convergence makes allowances for underlying factors that may
condition the degree of convergence that can occur.
Our set of other explanatory variables that may be relevant in
determining the evolution of social protection expenditures includes
53 control variables (macroeconomic, social and demographic
indicators, data on income and education, indicators of economic
freedom, etc). After correlation analysis, we excluded the statistically
non-significant indicators and focus on 6 variables to measure the
presence of conditional ? -convergence.  These factors are (Table 6):
?  GDPch - change in GDP per capita at PPS,
?  DRo - old age dependency rate,
?  DRy - youth dependency rate,
?  URt  - unemployment rate,
?  LFRm - male employment rate,
?  LFRf - female employment rate.
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Table 6. Conditional ? -Convergence in Social Protection
Expenditure in EU in 1993-2000,
annual growth rate per capita at PPS
Total
expenditure
Sickness &
disability
Old-age &
survivors
Family &
children
Unemploy-
ment
ß1 -0.0612 *** -0.0737 *** -0.0601 *** -0.0077 -0.0371 *
(0.0094) (0.0126) (0.0105) (0.0118) (0.0221)
GDPch 0.5596 *** 0.6968 *** 0.4538 *** 0.3967 ** 0.3339
(0.1069) (0.1382) (0.1151) (0.1855) (0.4068)
DRo 0.3485 ** 0.3077 0.4250 ** -0.2778 0.0245
(0.1639) (0.1958) (0.2071) (0.2895) (0.6281)
DRy -0.1762 * 0.0124 -0.4989 *** -0.3216 -0.1404
(0.1058) (0.1347) (0.1204) (0.2210) (0.3386)
URt -0.3656 *** -0.4962 *** -0.2691 ** 0.0084 -0.2508
(0.0933) (0.1223) (0.1073) (0.2068) (0.2787)
LFRm -0.0513 -0.3207 * 0.1037 -0.1396 -0.3462
(0.1369) (0.1739) (0.1547) (0.2699) (0.5800)
LFRf 0.0238 0.1403 * 0.0152 -0.0956 -0.0736
(0.0579) (0.0745) (0.0639) (0.1196) (0.2628)
Adj.R2 0.71 0.67 0.73 0.51 0.13
* p<0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01
As compared with the absolute ? -convergence, the additional
control variables substantially increased the explanatory power of
regression.  The Adj.R2 increased from 0.50 to 0.71. Changes in GDP
per capita (at PPS), unemployment rate and old age dependency rate
perform better than the other explanatory variables and are statistically
significant.
Table 6 reports the results for four major categories of social
protection expenditures and reveals sizeable differences across
expenditure components. A low level of convergence is rejected for
family benefits and unemployment sphere (ß1= ? 0.0077 and ß1=
? 0.0371, respectively), and in contrast, pensions and health
expenditure exhibit strong conditional convergence.
Our next step includes state dummies to estimate country-
specific shift and slope parameters additionally to the variables
described above as it is one of the most suitable alternative to the test
of stationarity in the case of shorter time series (see Table 7). The ? 1
coefficients increase after including dummies from ? 0.0612 to
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? 0.1586 and range from –0.1468 to –0.3205 for the different
components of social protection expenditures. This implies much
more rapid convergence, not to speak of comparison with absolute ? -
convergence (? 1 = ? 0.0369) and an increase in statistical significance
of variables (Adj.R2 increase from 0.71 to 0.79). Across social
protection expenditures, the statistical significance of unemployment
increased and this component exhibits much stronger conditional
convergence.
Table 7. Conditional ? -Convergence with Dummies in Social
Protection Expenditure in EU in 1993-2000, annual
growth rate per capita at PPS
Total
expenditure
Sickness &
disability
Old-age &
survivors
Family &
children
Unemploy-
ment
ß1 -0.1586 *** -0.2282 *** -0.1468 *** -0.2154 *** -0.3205 ***
(0.0370) (0.0508) (0.0399) (0.0688) (0.0780)
GDPch 0.5622 *** 0.6642 *** 0.5201 *** 0.8559 *** 0.4329
(0.1317) (0.1538) (0.1318) (0.2823) (0.3697)
DRo 0.3264 * 0.3925 * 0.5323 * 1.2319 3.0583
(0.1724) (0.2423) (0.2794) (1.6947) (2.0807)
DRy -0.2486 ** 0.0534 -0.2600 0.3341 -2.0917 *
(0.1175) (0.1493) (0.1773) (0.7994) (1.2187)
URt -0.2726 ** -0.4078 *** -0.2660 0.2167 2.9348 ***
(0.1368) (0.1426) (0.1675) (0.6271) (0.7929)
LFRm -0.0652 -0.2369 0.0064 -0.2640 2.5228 **
(0.1530) (0.2070) (0.1854) (0.8646) (0.9724)
LFRf 0.0184 0.1872 ** 0.0199 0.6147 -1.3984
(0.0648) (0.0951) (0.0831) (0.8094) (1.0689)
Adj.R2 0.79 0.75 0.80 0.66 0.47
* p<0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01
The statistically significant and positive country-specific slope
parameters in Greece and Portugal reduce the slope (? 1 - ? ) for these
countries, which still remains negative. According to the equation (4)
the convergence in these countries was less steep. But ceteris paribus,
the differences across EU countries in social protection expenditure in
1993-2000 have declined by the existence of convergence phenomena
also in Greece and Portugal.
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5. Conclusions
This paper examined the evidence and degree of cross-country
convergence in social protection expenditures in the EU during the
period 1993–2000. Our findings support in general the notion of s -
convergence, absolute ß-convergence and conditional ß-convergence
for both social protection expenditures per capita and as a share in
GDP. The low social protection expenditure countries of the south
(Portugal, Greece and Italy) have all been converging upwards
towards the EU average. The high social protection expenditure group
of countries, particularly in the north (Sweden, Finland and Denmark),
has been converging downward.
Our analysis indicated s -convergence of social protection
expenditures per capita as well as of the share of social protection
expenditures in GDP. The analysis also indicated convergence of levels
in three spheres of social protection in the period of analysis: sickness
and disability, old age and survivors, and unemployment. There was no
evidence of s -convergence in payment of child and family benefits
between countries.
There has taken place absolute ? -convergence in social
protection expenditure in all periods under study. As compared with
absolute ? -convergence, the additional six control variables
substantially increased the explanatory power of regression in
predicting country social expenditures. Changes in GDP per capita (at
PPS), unemployment rate and old age dependency rate perform better
than the other explanatory variables and are statistically significant.
Additional state dummies to estimate country-specific shift and slope
parameters as one of the most suitable alternatives to the test of
stationarity in the case of shorter time series indicated the higher level
of conditional ? -convergence and increase in statistical significance of
the variables.
? -convergence in a share of social protection expenditures in
GDP in these years had lower statistical significance.
Notes
1. PPS (purchasing power standard) – is a unit, which is based on the
Eurostat estimates of purchasing power parities (PPP). PPS eliminates
the effects caused by the differences of price levels between countries.
PPP expresses the real purchasing power of national currency and
differs from the official currency exchange rate.
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2. This has been thoroughly discussed by Martti Randveer  (2000).
3. We can distinguish also between catching-up and long-run convergence
(Bernard and Durlauf, 1995, 1996; Oxley and Greasley, 1995).
Catching-up implies that difference between two series is a stochastic
variable with a non-zero mean, suggesting that the deviation between
the series even if expected to decrease, would not disappear. A
sufficient condition for catching-up would be the existence of stochastic
cointegration between both variables. Conversely, long-run
convergence  is a more demanding level of convergence, since it implies
the absence of the difference between the series of countries in the long
time trend.
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Appendix 1. Absolute ? -convergence in Social Protection
Expenditure and Speed of Convergence in EU
in 1993-2000 (share of GDP)
 1993-2000 1993-1996 1996-1997 1997-2000
Coef.
Std.
Err. Coef.
Std.
Err. Coef.
Std.
Err. Coef.
Std.
Err.
Total
? 1 -0.045  0.030 -0.060 * 0.031 -0.076  0.065 0.042  0.040
? 0 -0.015 ** 0.006 -0.005 0.006 -0.036 *** 0.012 -0.015 * 0.007
? 0.054 0.044 0.066 0.038 0.079 0.070 -0.040 0.036
Adj.R2 0.15 0.22 0.10  0.08  
Thalf 13  10   9   -18   
Sickness&disability
? 1 -0.050 ** 0.019 -0.064 ** 0.028 -0.115 0.076 -0.055  0.041
? 0 0.049 *** 0.004 0.045 *** 0.005 0.028 * 0.013 0.057 *** 0.006
? 0.062 * 0.030 0.071 * 0.035 0.123 0.086 0.060 0.049
Adj.R2 0.34 0.29  0.15 0.12  
Thalf 11 10   6 12   
Old-age&survivors
? 1 -0.018 0.023 -0.031 0.036 -0.019 0.044 0.013 0.016
? 0 0.049*** 0.006 0.064*** 0.010 0.040*** 0.012 0.041*** 0.005
? 0.019 0.026 0.032 0.039 0.019 0.045 -0.013 0.016
Adj.R2 0.04 0.05  0.02  0.05  
Thalf 37 21   36    
Family&Children
? 1 -0.022 ** 0.010 -0.019  0.016 -0.043 ** 0.018 -0.019  0.016
? 0 0.053 *** 0.006 0.068 *** 0.010 0.032 ** 0.011 0.044 *** 0.009
? 0.024 * 0.012 0.020 0.017 0.044 ** 0.019 0.020 0.017
Adj.R2 0.28  0.10  0.31  0.10  
Thalf 29  35  16  35  
Unemployment
? 1 -0.052 ** 0.017 -0.063 ** 0.021 -0.045 0.029 -0.038 0.037
? 0 -0.012 0.013 0.017 0.015 -0.029 0.017 -0.029 0.021
? 0.065 ** 0.027 0.070 ** 0.026 0.046 0.030 0.040 0.042
Adj.R2 0.41  0.41  0.16  0.07  
Thalf 11   10   15   17   
* p<0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01
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Appendix 2. The Estimation of Country-Specific Differences
in Shift and Slope Parameters (compared with
EU average)
 ? (shift)  d (slope)  
Austria 0.0192  -0.0006  
Belgium 0.0048  -0.0156  
Germany 0.0119  -0.0083  
Denmark 0.0487 * -0.0116  
Spain -0.0742 *** -0.0164  
Greece -0.0387  0.0483 ***
France -0.0030  -0.0218  
Finland -0.0187  -0.0322 *
Italy -0.0106  -0.0012  
Ireland -0.0642 *** -0.0068  
Luxembourg 0.0542 ** -0.0004  
Netherlands 0.0087  -0.0173  
Portugal -0.0293  0.0592 **
Sweden 0.0106  -0.0240
United Kingdom -0.0190  -0.0188  
 * p<0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01
